Breaking down automaticity: Case ambiguity and the shift to reflective approaches in clinical reasoning by Mamede, S. (Silvia) et al.
Breaking down automaticity: case ambiguity and the
shift to reflective approaches in clinical reasoning
SI´LVIA MAMEDE,1 HENK G SCHMIDT,2 REMY M J P RIKERS,2 JU´LIO C PENAFORTE1 & JOA˜O M COELHO-FILHO3
CONTEXT Two modes of case processing have been
shown to underlie diagnostic judgements: analytical
and non-analytical reasoning. An optimal form of
clinical reasoning is suggested to combine both
modes. Conditions leading doctors to shift from the
usual mode of non-analytical reasoning to reflective
reasoning have not been identified. This paper
reports a study aimed at exploring these conditions
by investigating the effects of ambiguity of clinical
cases on clinical reasoning.
METHODS Participants were 16 internal medicine
residents in the Brazilian state of Ceara´. They were
asked to diagnose 20 clinical cases and recall case
information. The independent variable was the
degree of ambiguity of clinical cases, with 2 levels:
straightforward (i.e. non-ambiguous) and ambigu-
ous. Dependent variables were processing time,
diagnostic accuracy and proposition per category
recalled. Data were analysed using a repeated
measures design.
RESULTS Participants processed straightforward
cases faster and more accurately than ambiguous
ones. The proportion of text propositions recalled
was significantly lower (t[15] = 2.29, P = 0.037) in
ambiguous cases, and an interaction effect between
case version and proposition category was also found
(F[5, 75] = 4.52, P = 0.001, d = 0.232, observed
power = 0.962). Furthermore, participants recalled
significantly more literal propositions from the
ambiguous cases than from the straightforward cases
(t[15] = 2.28, P = 0.037).
CONCLUSIONS Ambiguity of clinical cases was
shown to lead residents to switch from automatic to
reflective reasoning, as indicated by longer process-
ing time, and more literal propositions recalled in
ambiguous cases.
KEYWORDS *clinical competence; *decision mak-
ing; *diagnosis; Brazil; *internship and residency;
judgement.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicious judgements and effective decision making
define successful clinical problem solving. Two dif-
ferent approaches for processing clinical cases, non-
analytical and analytical, have been shown to underlie
diagnostic decisions.1,2 Experienced doctors diag-
nose routine problems essentially by recognising
similarities between the actual case and examples of
previous patients.3 This pattern-recognition, non-
analytical, form of clinical reasoning is largely auto-
matic and unconscious.3,4 In the second, analytical
form of case processing, clinicians arrive at a diag-
nosis by analysing signs and symptoms, relying on
biomedical knowledge when necessary.2,5,6
It has been suggested that these 2 types of reasoning
result from different kinds of knowledge used for
diagnosing cases. According to Schmidt and Boshu-
izen,3 medical expertise development entails a
process of knowledge restructuring. Biomedical
knowledge is gradually encapsulated under clinical
knowledge and, with clinical experience, scripts of
diseases and exemplars of patients, is stored in the
longterm memory. Empirical studies have high-
lighted the role of scripts, examples and encapsu-
lated knowledge in non-analytical processing.3,7,8
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These studies have often used the clinical case
paradigm, in which participants are requested to:
1 read a clinical case description;
2 provide a diagnosis;
3 recall all case information, and
4 explain case findings.
Expert doctors were shown to recall less information
from the case description in a literal format than did
advanced students. By contrast, experts generated
more high-level inferences (i.e. inferences based on
more than 1 finding in the case).8,9 Experts appar-
ently make shortcuts in their lines of reasoning while
processing cases. They easily recognise a set of signs
and symptoms as characteristic of a disease, almost
automatically infer relevant encapsulated concepts,
and generate diagnostic hypotheses, without needing
to analyse individual findings and pathophysiological
mechanisms.8,9
Research on medical expertise has particularly
investigated non-analytical case processing. Recently,
interest in analytical diagnostic reasoning has risen,
stimulated by concerns about medical errors. Despite
its effectiveness in routine situations, non-analytical
reasoning may lead doctors to fail when they
encounter complex or unusual problems.10,11 Heu-
ristics and experienced doctors difficulties in refor-
mulating initial hypotheses have been pointed out as
potential causes of errors.12,13 Reflective practice,
conceptualised as doctors ability to critically reflect
on their own reasoning and decisions, has been
considered crucial for optimal clinical perfor-
mance.14,15 A recent study suggested a multi-dimen-
sional structure of reflective practice in medicine.14 It
would imply an elaborate, careful consideration of
case findings and critical scrutiny of ones own
reasoning. This thoughtful approach is not expected
to be used in routine problems, but would be
triggered by troublesome situations.16 The conditions
that trigger reflection, however, are not known.
The purpose of this study was to examine factors that
lead doctors to switch from their usual non-analytical
reasoning to a reflective diagnostic approach.* More
specifically, we aimed to investigate whether ambi-
guity in clinical cases would lead to a breakdown of
automaticity. By ambiguous cases, we mean a patient
presentation that corresponds to the typical pattern
of a disease but also includes features consistent with
alternative diagnoses. The present study required
residents to read a clinical case, provide a diagnosis
and, subsequently, recall the case information. Based
on previous studies on reflective practice,14 we
hypothesised that ambiguity in clinical cases would
lead doctors to shift from non-analytical to reflective
reasoning. According to the knowledge encapsula-
tion view, doctors will largely use encapsulated
knowledge when dealing with routine cases,8,17 when
they do not need to evaluate the findings extensively.
Reflective reasoning, however, would require more
systematic consideration of individual signs and
symptoms. Based on these assumptions, we made a
set of predictions. Firstly, processing time will be
higher for ambiguous cases than for straightforward
cases because ambiguous cases lead to reflection.
Secondly, recall protocols of ambiguous cases will be
more elaborate than protocols of straightforward
cases, not only in terms of literal propositions but
clinical expertise
Overview
What is already known on this subject
Two different approaches for processing clin-
ical cases, non-analytical and analytical, have
been shown to underlie diagnostic decisions.
It was not previously known, however, what
makes doctors shift from the usual automatic
reasoning to reflective reasoning.
What this study adds
This study shows that the ambiguity of clinical
cases is among the conditions that lead doc-
tors to adopt reflective reasoning approaches
for diagnosing clinical problems. It also con-
tributes to understanding of how the 2 modes
of reasoning act in case processing.
Suggestions for further research
Further investigation is required to identify
other conditions underlying the switch from
non-analytical to analytical diagnostic reason-
ing, and whether and how reflective reasoning
might be learned.
*The 2 main forms of case processing have traditionally been
designated by the terms non-analytical and analytical, the latter
conceived and operationalised largely in terms of mental, cognitive
processes. Reflective practice in medicine has been conceptualised as a
set of behaviours and reasoning processes involving affective dimen-
sions, which would also be expected to play a role in the reflective
processing of clinical cases. As this paper is aimed at calling attention to
the affective skills required for reflective diagnostic approaches, we
have adopted the term reflective reasoning, which will be used
throughout the text.
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also in terms of high-level inferences. That is, an
ambiguous case will trigger additional inferences
resulting from the doctors effort to understand this
complex case. Finally, diagnostic accuracy will be
higher for straightforward cases than for ambiguous
cases, which would validate our manipulation.
METHODS
Design
In this experimental study all participants performed
under both experimental conditions (i.e. repeated
measures). The independent variable was case type
(straightforward versus ambiguous). Dependent
variables were processing time, diagnostic accuracy
and propositions (per category) recalled.
Participants
The participants were 16 second-year internal med-
icine residents from teaching hospitals in the Brazil-
ian State of Ceara´ (mean age = 27.06 years; standard
deviation [SD] = 1.06 years). A total of 22 eligible
residents were invited to participate and informed
consent was obtained.
Materials
The materials consisted of 20 written clinical cases,
covering common conditions within the domain of
internal medicine (Table 1). Case descriptions
reported contextual information, complaints, find-
ings from history taking and physical examination,
and test results. There were 2 versions of each case. In
the straightforward version, the case corresponded to
a text-book case, exhibiting the set of features
encountered in the typical presentation of the
disease. The case description strongly suggested only
1 diagnosis. A few features were added to the
straightforward version to generate the clinically
ambiguous version. These features consisted of
information about the patients context, medical
history and ⁄or complaints, which raised the plausi-
bility of an alternative diagnosis. Table 2 presents an
example of a case. Items in italics were included
in the clinically ambiguous version only. Cases
Table 1 Diagnostics of the cases used in the experiment
1 Community-acquired pneumonia
2 Stomach cancer
3 Acute bacterial endocarditis
4 Rheumatoid arthritis
5 Inflammatory bowel disease
6 Acute pyelonephritis
7 Acute viral hepatitis
8 Acute bacterial meningitis
9 Pseudomembranous colitis
10 Hyperthyroidism
11 Deficiency of vitamin B12
12 Addisons disease





18 Acute viral pericarditis
19 Acute myeloid leukaemia
20 Acute appendicitis
Table 2 Example of a case used in the experiment. Items in italics were given only in the ambiguous version of the case
The patient is a 27-year-old woman, who complains of pain in the right side of the chest that started suddenly 24 hours ago. The pain becomes worse
with inspiring and is associated with dyspnoea. The patient denies cough, expectoration, haemoptysis or wheezing. She describes having felt warm,
but did not take her temperature. She denies oedema in the inferior limbs and says she has never had respiratory problems. She has used no
medications other than oral contraceptive pills. She raises various types of birds at home and smokes 20 cigarettes per day. She does not consume alcohol and
has no risk factors for HIV. Her family history is negative for asthma. Her father had pulmonary emphysema and died from coronary heart disease when he was
62 years old
Physical examination
The patient is slightly obese. She appears uncomfortable and is in mild respiratory distress
The patients temperature is 38 C; pulse is 115 beats ⁄min; blood pressure is 140 ⁄ 80 mmHg; respiration count is 30 ⁄min. There is no jugular
turgidity. Cardiac examination is normal. Lung examination does not show rhonchus, crepitations or wheeze. Abdomen examination does not
show abnormalities. The extremities are normal, without oedema or cyanosis
Tests
Haematocrit: 42%; haemoglobin: 14.5g dl)1
White cell count: 6000 ⁄mm3, with 74% neutrophils and 26% lymphocytes
Chest X-ray: normal cardiac area, small infiltrate in the right lower lobe
Electrocardiogram: sinus tachycardia
Arterial blood gas values: pH: 7.49; pCO2: 32 mmHg; pO2: 60 mmHg
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contained an average of 39.67 (SD = 11.13) proposi-
tions (i.e. discrete idea units in the text).18
Two expert doctors with a specialty board certifica-
tion in internal medicine and over 15 years of
clinical practice prepared the cases. They were
presented in the format of a booklet containing, for
each case, a page with the case description and a
space to write the diagnostic hypothesis, followed by
a blank page for free recall. Each booklet contained
20 cases to be diagnosed, 10 under each experi-
mental condition (i.e. straightforward and ambigu-
ous). Ambiguous and straightforward cases were
presented alternately. Half the booklets started with
an ambiguous case and half with a straightforward
case. The presentation sequence of the 20 cases was
also counterbalanced in each booklet to control for
order effects.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of a training phase and a
test phase. In the training phase, 2 sample cases were
presented to familiarise participants with the proce-
dures. There were no time constraints but the
experimenter asked participants to strive to provide
the most likely diagnoses for the cases as fast as
possible. This was in order to prevent participants, as
much as possible, from evaluating cases in a more
elaborate manner than their usual processing
mode. In the test phase, each participant received a
booklet containing cases to be solved by the same
procedure used in the training phase. The partici-
pant was asked to first read the case and provide the
most likely diagnosis, and then to turn the page and
recall the case information. For each case, the
experimenter recorded processing time from the
moment the participant started to read the case to
the moment he or she wrote down the diagnosis.
Participants were tested individually in sessions
lasting approximately 60 minutes.
Analysis
The accuracy of the diagnosis provided by partici-
pants was independently rated by 2 experts with
specialty board certification in internal medicine,
and over 18 years of professional practice in teaching
hospitals. Diagnoses were rated on a 5-point scale
ranging from 0 (completely incorrect diagnosis) to
4 (completely correct diagnosis). For example, 1
point was attributed to a diagnosis that was not the
correct main diagnosis for the case but contained at
least 1 of its constituents (e.g. upper gastrointestinal
bleeding in a case of stomach cancer). The inter-rater
agreement between the 2 experts was 86%.
Disagreements between raters were resolved by
discussion.
The free-recall protocols were scored by means of a
propositional analysis method introduced by Patel
and Groen.18 Each protocol was segmented into
propositions. A proposition consists of 2 concepts
linked by a qualifier, such as causation, specification,
temporal information or location. For instance, the
protocol fragment in Table 2, The patient is a 27-
year-old woman, with complaints of pain in the right
side of the chest that started suddenly 24 hours ago
consists of 6 propositions:
1 patient specification (woman);
2 patient specification (27-year-old);
3 complaints specification (pain);
4 pain location (in the right side of the chest);
5 starting specification (suddenly), and
6 complaints temporal information (24 hours ago).
Each proposition in the recall protocol was matched
against the propositions in the text of the case
description. Based on their relationships with the
propositions in the text, the recalled propositions
were classified into 6 categories: literal (or
paraphrased) propositions; low-level inferred
propositions; high-level inferred propositions;
non-significant mistakes; significant mistakes, and
non-existing propositions. Low-level inferred pro-
positions are inferences based on only 1 proposition
in the text, whereas high-level inferences are
propositions that can be matched with a number of
propositions in the case description. In Table 2,
Fever or tachycardia are examples of low-level
inferences. Pleuritic pain and respiratory alkalosis are
possible high-level inferences.
High-level inferences have been considered to be
evidence of the use of encapsulated knowledge.17,19
The total number of propositions in the recall
protocol was obtained by summing the number of
literal propositions, low-level inferences and high-
level inferences. When 2 researchers independently
scored a subset of protocols, an inter-rater agreement
of 0.92 (P < 0.05) was found. Differences were
resolved by discussion and, as the procedure turned
out to be reliable, scoring of the remaining protocols
proceeded with 1 judge.
Data from cases solved in each condition were
collapsed for each participant. Descriptive statistics
were obtained for each experimental condition
(straightforward versus ambiguous), and paired
clinical expertise1188
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sample t-tests were performed for comparing pro-
cessing time, diagnostic accuracy and propositions
recalled in both conditions. We controlled for case
length by calculating processing time per proposition
and proportion of propositions recalled. Repeated
measures analysis of variance, with case type and
proposition category as within-subject factors, was
used for comparison of the number of propositions
recalled in the 6 categories of propositions in the 2
experimental conditions. Posthoc paired t-tests were
performed for comparison across the levels of the
proposition category. Effects size (partial g2) and




Table 3 shows the mean total processing time and the
mean time per proposition for both conditions.
Paired t-tests revealed a significant difference
between straightforward cases and ambiguous cases,
both for total time (t[15] = 5.03, P < 0.001, partial
g2 = 0.628, OP = 0.997) and time per proposition
(t[15] = 4.19, P = 0.001, partial g2 = 0.539,
OP = 0.974).
Free recall
Table 4 presents proportions of propositions recalled
from the text in both conditions. They were lower in
the ambiguous cases than in the straightforward ones
and this difference was significant (t[15] = 2.29,
P = 0.037, partial g2 = 0.259, OP = 0.573). The
proportion of straightforward propositions (i.e. prop-
ositions that constituted the description of straight-
forward cases) recalled was significantly lower in
ambiguous cases than in straightforward cases
(t[15] = 6.14, P < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.715, OP = 1.0).
Table 5 presents the mean number of propositions
recalled in the 6 categories. Analysis of variance
showed a large significant effect of category of
proposition on the number of propositions recalled
(F[5, 75] = 46.54, P < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.756,
OP = 1.00). There was no significant main effect of
case type (F[1, 15] = 1.53, P = 0.23, partial g2 = 0.093,
OP = 0.212), but a large interaction between case
type and proposition category was found (F[5,
75] = 4.52, P = 0.001, partial g2 = 0.232, OP = 0.962).
Posthoc t-tests showed a significant difference
between the mean number of literal propositions
recalled in straightforward cases versus ambiguous
cases (t[15] = 2.28, P = 0.037). Comparisons of the
mean numbers of propositions recalled for the other
categories did not show significant differences.
Diagnostic accuracy
Mean diagnostic accuracy was higher for straightfor-
ward cases (mean = 3.09, SD = 0.45) than for
ambiguous cases (mean = 2.61, SD = 0.51). A paired
Table 3 Mean processing time and mean time per proposition (in sec-





n Mean SD n Mean SD
Processing time 16 548.50 166.74 16 687.81 218.06
Processing time
per proposition
16 1.47 0.43 16 1.64 0.51
Table 5 Mean number of propositions recalled in each category as a





n Mean SD n Mean SD
Number of literal
propositions recalled
16 77.00 40.84 16 84.43 49.93
Number of low-level
inferences recalled
16 12.31 7.15 16 10.75 5.92
Number of high-level
inferences recalled
16 10.06 7.37 16 8.37 4.27
Number of
non-significant mistakes
16 2.75 2.49 16 2.62 3.07
Number of significant
mistakes
16 0.75 1.61 16 0.81 1.05
Number of non-existing
propositions
16 1.44 1.63 16 2.56 3.40
SD = standard deviation






n Mean SD n Mean SD
Number of propositions
recalled
16 9.94 4.46 16 10.36 5.19
Proportion of
propositions recalled




16 0.27 0.12 16 0.21 0.11
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t-test showed that this difference was significant
(t[15] = 2.41, P = 0.029, partial g2 = 0.279,
OP = 0.616), which indicates that our ambiguous
cases were more complex (i.e. our manipulation was
valid).
DISCUSSION
This study was concerned with conditions that lead
doctors to shift from non-analytical to reflective
reasoning when solving clinical cases. Based on
previous studies on reflective practice in medicine,14
it was hypothesised that 1 of these conditions was
ambiguity of a clinical problem. In this experiment,
features in case presentation were manipulated to
create either a straightforward or an ambiguous case.
It was hypothesised that ambiguity would lead
participants to engage in elaborate, reflective case
processing, and, therefore, spend more time on
diagnosing ambiguous cases than straightforward
ones. Furthermore, based on the notion of reflective
practice in medicine,14,15 it was predicted that
reflective reasoning would be expressed by more
elaborate recall protocols (i.e. more literal proposi-
tions and inferences) of ambiguous cases. Results
showed that participants processed straightforward
cases faster than ambiguous ones. Surprisingly, the
proportion of total propositions recalled was lower
and qualitatively different in the ambiguous
condition than in the straightforward condition. By
contrast, participants also recalled more literal
propositions from the ambiguous cases than from
the straightforward cases. Differences in the number
of inferences generated in the 2 conditions were not
significant.
Findings are largely consistent with the hypothesis
put forward in this study. Doctors spent more time
processing ambiguous cases than straightforward
cases. Furthermore, differences in the literal propo-
sitions recalled suggest that these propositions were
more highly activated in their case representation of
the ambiguous cases. Apparently, doctors realised
that the ambiguous cases required more elaborate
exploration of the findings, which is characteristic of
reflective practice in medicine.14 A recent study
exploring question format, task difficulty and rea-
soning strategies also suggested that case difficulty
triggers reflection.20
Reflective practice also entails promptness to explore
features in a case that do not fit with initial hypoth-
eses.14 Participants indeed seem to have engaged in
such exploration when faced with contradictory
clinical findings. The lower proportion of straight-
forward propositions recalled in ambiguous cases
indicates that doctors attention was directed to the
atypical features that were added in this experimental
condition. This could also explain the lower total
proportion of propositions recalled in ambiguous
cases.
Our findings call attention to the role of clinical
features in diagnostic processes. Several studies
demonstrated the significance of encapsulated
knowledge in experts reasoning, but also suggested
the potential importance of individual features.8,17,19
These studies usually explored differences in case
processing associated with expertise level. The stim-
uli, therefore, were frequently the same, whereas
participants levels of expertise varied. The present
study investigated whether differences in case char-
acteristics would affect the diagnostic reasoning of
participants with similar levels of expertise. Results
suggest that individual features in fact play an
important role in case representation, and that
doctors reliance on analysis of signs and symptoms
increases with the ambiguity of clinical problems.
Recognition of ambiguity may only happen if doctors
analyse to some extent individual features in their
process of identifying a pattern in a set of signs and
symptoms. In the course of this process, ambiguous
findings may then break down the usual automatic
reasoning and lead doctors to engage in reflection.
Contrary to our predictions, there were no significant
differences between conditions in high-level infer-
ences. It was expected that reflection would also
manifest itself by generating more inferences to
account for ambiguous data. A possible explanation
for this finding may be that the straightforward cases
were more complex to resolve than expected, result-
ing in similar performances on both types of case.
This explanation is substantiated by the participants
diagnostic performance on the straightforward cases,
which resulted in about 75% of the maximum
possible score (i.e. rather low for the straightforward
cases). Alternatively, we might argue that the ambig-
uous cases were not complex enough to generate
extra inferences to deal with the problem. This
interpretation is also, to some extent, substantiated
by the participants diagnostic performance on this
type of case. They scored 65% of the maximum score,
which is not much lower than their score on the
straightforward cases. It is important to note that
previous studies argued that, unlike diagnostic per-
formance and processing speed, the measure of free
recall, and, in particular, high-level inferences, is
often not sensitive enough to reveal small differences
clinical expertise1190
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between doctors in different experimental
conditions.17,21
It has been suggested that clinical teaching should
aim to provide students with multiple reasoning
strategies that could enable them to work through
problems in different situations.1,2,22 This requires
recognising when more reflection is required. By
indicating that ambiguity in a clinical case apparently
acts as a cue for reflection, our findings might
facilitate teaching of a combined, integrated clinical
reasoning. However, how this might be done is still to
be explored. Findings also highlighted the role of
individual features in doctors reasoning, which
reaffirms the value attributed to teaching the
importance of systematic analysis of clinical cases.
Some questions remain for future investigation.
Firstly, ambiguity in clinical presentation was shown
to break down automaticity, but other conditions that
generate a sense of complexity and are still to be
identified might have a similar effect. Secondly, light
was shed on the role of individual features in
diagnostic reasoning, but there is much more to be
discovered about how reflection manifests itself in
case processing. Finally, some doctors seem to
recognise, more than others, when a problem
requires an elaborate mode of processing. As far as
conditions leading to reflective reasoning become
known, the possibility of teaching doctors to recog-
nise and adopt reflective approaches increases. How
these reflective practices might be learned remains a
question yet to be answered.
The present study has some limitations. As we have
outlined above, the clinical case paradigm assumes
that case representation can be probed by case recall.
However, we cannot exclude the notion that concepts
activated during case processing in both conditions
did not appear in the protocols or that inferences in
the protocols were not generated during case pro-
cessing, but during the recall task.19,21 Another
limitation is inherent to the laboratory environment.
Participants solved written clinical cases under
experimental conditions, which restricts the genera-
lisability of findings to performance in clinical
settings.
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